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Abstract
Competitive bonuses are commonly used to promote higher productivity in the
workplace. Yet, these types of incentives could have negative spillovers on cowork-
ers’ prosocial behavior in subsequent tasks. To investigate this question, we conduct
a lab-in-the-field experiment in Ghana. In a between-subjects design, participants
complete a real-effort task under a competitive, threshold, or random payment
while holding payment differentials constant across treatments. Before and after,
we measure prosociality through a public goods and a social value orientation game.
Competition reduces prosociality when the dispersion of payments is high. However,
when there is less at stake, competition does not affect prosociality.
JEL Codes: C93, D03, J33
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1 Introduction
The success of an organization critically depends on social relations among coworkers
(Beal et al., 2003). Good interpersonal relations are associated with greater willingness
of people within an organization to help each other, share information and cooperate on
joint projects (Brief and Motowidlo, 1986). In addition, such relations facilitate communi-
cation, enhance employee commitment, foster individual learning, and result in improved
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organizational performance (Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Adler and Kwon, 2002; Bright
et al., 2006). Employees also report higher job satisfaction and organizational commitment
as well as less absenteeism when they perceive that coworkers are friendly (Rhoades and
Eisenberger, 2002). Hence, managers should try to create friendlier work environments.
At the same time, managers are under extreme pressure to increase individual produc-
tivity and thus, turn to incentives for boosting performance. Relative payment schemes,
in which workers compete for a bonus for example, are a very common instrument used
in the workplace. Both theoretical and empirical literatures suggest that competitive,
relative performance schemes can increase effort and productivity compared to piece-rate
payments, but necessarily relative to fixed-payment schemes (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981;
Erev et al., 1993; van Dijk et al., 2001; Irlenbusch and Ruchala, 2008; Bandiera et al.,
2011). Yet, it is unclear whether competitive incentives negatively affect the ex-post
quality of coworker relationships.
In this paper, we assess how competitive versus individual payments obtained from a
non-collaborative task impact cooperation and prosocial attitudes after such a task. Our
setting can be thought of as an environment in which individuals work independently
and the best performer receives a bonus. We thus consider the effect that this payment
has on interactions among coworkers afterwards. Our main hypothesis is that competitive
payment schemes generate a negative effect on the quality of coworker relationships. There
are various channels that might give rise to this effect. First, competition generates
a feeling of rivalry among competitors. Confrontations in the workplace might cause
workers to see each other as opponents and thus, adopt more individualistic behavior (e.g.
Drago and Garvey, 1998; Brandts et al., 2009; Dechenaux et al., 2012). Second, there are
always winners and losers in a competition. This generates inequality in endowments and
status. Empirical evidence suggests that those two forms of heterogeneity are associated
with lower levels of prosociality and lower incentives to enter into a competition (e.g.
Chan et al., 1999; Cherry et al., 2005; Buckley and Croson, 2006). Moreover, it has been
shown that people with a pronounced aversion to inequality are less likely to select into a
competition (e.g. Bartling et al., 2009). So, if forced to work under a competitive payment
scheme, these individuals may become unsatisfied with the workplace environment and
ultimately reduce their prosociality. Lastly, competitive payments can be regarded as
unfair. This in turn may decrease incentives to act prosocially after individuals have
been exposed to a competition (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Particularly those who
usually work in teams might perceive an individual bonus scheme as unfair; this could
cause frustration and less prosocial behavior.
2
To test the effect of competition on prosociality, we conduct a lab-in-the-field exper-
iment (artefactual field experiment in the terminology of Harrison and List, 2004) with
workers from a banana-producing agribusiness in Ghana. The field context is particularly
relevant given the research question for two reasons. First, due to low productivity at the
time the experiments were being designed, the firm was considering introducing a com-
petitive bonus system. Second, teamwork is important for the performance of the firm.
About 50% of the tasks (e.g. bunchcare, harvesting, and quality control in packaging)
rely on teams.1 Accordingly, the firm permitted us to do an experiment with a sample of
its workers in order to test the potential effectiveness (on productivity) and side effects
(on prosociality) of a competitive bonus system.
In our experimental design, we randomly and confidentially match two participants
for the duration of a three-stage experiment.2 In the first stage, we measure baseline
prosociality via a one-shot public goods game (PGG) and a social value orientation (SVO)
game (a` la Murphy et al., 2011). To mitigate income and reputational effects, feedback
on the outcomes of the first stage is provided only after subjects complete the post-
questionnaire. In the second stage, participants complete a real-effort/output task where
they individually assemble ballpoint pens. We implement a between-subjects design in
which each subject is randomly allocated to either a competitive, a threshold, or a random
payment scheme. In the competitive scheme, the participant who assembles most pens
correctly earns a high payment; in the threshold scheme, every participant who correctly
assembles more than a given number pens earns a high payment; and in the random
scheme, the high earner is determined by chance. We refer to high- and low-income
earners as “winners” and “losers” regardless of treatment. We also vary the difference
between the winner’s and loser’s payoffs, i.e. the dispersion in payments. In the high-
dispersion condition, the winner’s payoff is 3 times the loser’s while in the low-dispersion
condition, it is 1.5 times. These variations lead to a 3×2 design. In the third stage, we
measure prosociality again by means of the PGG and the SVO. In the analysis, we first
compare effort and then, changes in prosociality (PGG or SVO) between the first and the
third stage across payment schemes and dispersion levels. We also assess the effect of the
scheme across winners and losers. The behavior in competitive and random relative to
threshold allows us to disentangle the effect of winning against another person from the
pure effect of receiving a higher or lower payment by luck. To test for other mechanisms,
we also elicit preferences for risk, competition, and inequality aversion pre-experiment.
1Of course, the whole production line could also be considered one large team as it is an integrated
production system where failure in one setting affects another.
2This is comparable to van Dijk et al. (2002).
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We find the following. When much is at stake, i.e. the dispersion between the winner’s
and loser’s payoffs is high, competition crowds out prosociality. This is in line with prior
findings (e.g. Buser and Dreber, 2015). The effect seems to be mainly driven by those
who (1) win the competition (comparable to Schurr and Ritov, 2016; Gee et al., 2016),
(2) are more inequality averse, (3) usually work in teams, and (4) are unaware of the
existing bonus system. However, when there is less at stake, competition does not affect
prosociality. The random payment scheme also seems to crowd out prosociality when the
dispersion of payments is high while having no impact when dispersion is low. However,
this crowding-out effect is less than in the competitive treatment; at least when it pertains
to one of the outcomes, SVO. This suggests that competition does have a distinguishable
effect on prosociality from random. Overall, our findings suggest that the impact of
competitive schemes (such as relative pay for performance) on workplace cooperation is
likely to be context-specific. So, managers should keep the nuances of incentive systems
in mind as they consider implementing such schemes in the workplace (as alluded to by
for example Holmstro¨m, 2017).
Theoretical and lab-experimental evidence suggest that individuals respond to incen-
tives induced by competition. First, in order to win a competition people may (1) sabotage
competitors (e.g. Lazear, 1989; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2011), (2) behave more dishon-
estly (e.g. Gill et al., 2013; Kilduff et al., 2016), (3) be less trusting/trustworthy (e.g. Dirks
and Ferrin, 2003; Keck and Karelaia, 2012), and (4) cooperate and coordinate more (e.g.
Bornstein and Erev, 1994; Bornstein et al., 2002). Second, some papers have examined
whether exposure to competition or awareness of it could crowd out ex-post prosociality
by increasing dishonesty, destructive behavior and individualism, or by affecting moral
judgment (e.g. Chen, 2011; Buser and Dreber, 2015; Schurr and Ritov, 2016; Jauernig
et al., 2016).3 Third, a related line of literature argues that the potential downside effects
of relative pay for performance depend on organizational transparency (e.g. Ockenfels
et al., 2015; Breza et al., 2016; Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson, 2017).
Our main novelties relative to such literature are (1) experimental variation of the
strength of competition by having high- and low-dispersion conditions; (2) the field con-
text, which allows us to assess how relevant pre-characteristics or conditions “outside of
the lab” impact responses to our treatments; (3) the use of a threshold payment scheme,
which enables us to keep the distribution of payments (mean and variance) similar across
competitive and non-competitive payments; (4) the pre- and post-elicitation of measures
3This has also led to a tangential research agenda exploring the ‘thin line’ between competition and
prosociality (e.g. Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2013; Milkman et al., 2014), as tends to be the case in most
naturally-occurring workplace environments.
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of prosociality, which allow us to control for baseline differences that could confound
the treatment estimates; and (5) the exploration of underlying mechanisms that prior
literature has not.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the field context
and study design. Section 3 presents the main findings. Finally, Section 4 concludes with
some discussion, potential policy implications, and avenues for future work.
2 Study design
2.1 Field context
We recruit workers from a major banana-producing agribusiness in Ghana. The firm
is fair-trade certified and exports all of its produce, which constitutes 95% of Ghana’s
national production of bananas to Europe. Its workforce comprises approximately 1815
men and 230 women, all of whom are employed full-time. Most of the employees complete
basic jobs such as bunchcare, harvesting, packaging and quality control.
Banana production is divided into eight sectors. All sectors have the same structure:
a field with a cableway system moving the banana bunches to one of eight packing houses.
The majority of employees are specialized in a specific job and work in a specific sector.
Sectors 1-7 employ 200 to 250 people every day from Monday to Friday. About 45 people
are employed on sector 8, where organic bananas are cultivated. The remaining workers
are not attached to a specific sector and get assigned based on need every morning.
Apart from being assigned to a sector, workers also specialize in a certain type of job such
as caring for and harvesting of banana bunches, cutting leafs off the banana trees, and
packaging bananas for transport. Workers in several of these jobs – bunchcare, harvesting,
and quality control of packaging – report that they regularly work in teams.
In order to foster higher productivity, the firm established a rather complex bonus
system that rewards employees when a target production level is reached. Approximately
one third of the workers report being unaware of how the existing bonus system works.
At the time these experiments were being designed, the firm was considering revising its
existing bonus (i.e., relative/competitive payment) scheme. Therefore, the managers gave
our research team permission to carry out the experiments with their workers. The results
of the study were also presented to them.
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2.2 Experimental design
A study session comprised a pre-survey, an experiment with three stages (the crux of
the session), and a post-questionnaire as shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of the
experiment, we randomly and confidentially matched two participants (i and j). Groups
remained fixed throughout the experiment. Instructions were presented stage by stage.
In the first stage, we elicited the baseline level of prosociality. In the second stage,
participants engaged in an individual real-effort task under one of six treatments with
either an individual or a relative payment scheme (as explained in Section 1 and reiterated
in Section 2.3). In the third stage, we elicited participants’ ex-post level of prosociality
using the same measures as in the first stage. We thus assess the change in prosociality
from the first to the third stage as a result of being exposed to an individual versus a
relative payment scheme. Below we explain the procedures used in each of the stages.
Stage 1: Baseline measures of prosociality
Prosociality was measured through two games: a one-shot public goods game (PGG) and
a social value orientation (SVO) game, the order of which was randomized. In the PGG
(Figure 2), subjects received an endowment of GHS 10 (represented by 10 paper coins
during the task) and had to decide how much to invest in an individual or a joint account
(represented by two envelopes). The return on investment in the private account was
1 while the marginal per-capita return from the joint account was 0.7. After making a
decision, each subject i was asked to guess the amount the other person j contributed
to the group account. Correct guesses earned GHS 2; guesses that deviated by one unit
earned GHS 1; and guesses that deviated by two units earned GHS 0.5.
The SVO game (Figure 3) is based on Murphy et al. (2011).4 Due to time constraints,
we used the reduced version in which subjects compare six distinct money allocations for
themselves (i) and their partners (j). To calculate the so-called SVO angle, the preferred
amounts across the six decision sets are summed up for i and j respectively and then, the
inverse tangent of the proportion of the sums is used to determine the angle. The higher
the angle, the more altruistic/prosocial a person is. This game was played via the strategy
method and accordingly, the role of payoff-allocator (dictator) was randomly assigned to
one of the participants (more when discussing information revelation further below).
4The original amounts were divided by 12.5 such that incentives were similar across SVO and PGG.
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Stage 2: Real-effort task
Subjects completed a real-effort (RE) task in which we exogenously varied the incentives
for performance. The task entailed assembling ballpoint pens for eight minutes (Figure 4).
Each participant received components for up to 65 ballpoint pens. This task was chosen
since it can easily be completed regardless of education level and it is simple to assess
quality: A properly functioning (high-quality) pen was one that was able to eject/retract;
anything else was of low quality. For purposes of payment, only properly functioning pens
were counted.
Stage 3: Ex-post level of prosociality
In the last stage, prosociality was measured again using the same procedures as in Stage
1. The only difference was that the decision sets for the SVO game were presented in a
different order to mitigate mere mimicking/repetition of the decisions made previously.
2.3 Treatments and procedures
We implemented a 3×2 between-subjects design with three different payment schemes
(threshold, competitive, and random) and two different dispersion levels between winners
and losers (high and low). Subject-pairs were randomly assigned to one of the resulting six
treatments (Table 1). In the threshold scheme (T ), any participant who assembled 40 or
more pens correctly (the median output observed during pilot sessions of the competition,
high-dispersion treatment) received a high payment while those who did not received a low
payment. Recall that we refer to participants who received the high payment as winners
and those who received the low payment as losers (not to be confused with high- and low-
dispersion treatments). In the competitive scheme (C), payments were based on relative
performance. The subject (in the pair) who assembled most pens correctly won/earned
the high payment. Finally, in the random scheme (R), the winner was determined at
random. In the high-dispersion treatments (H), the winner and loser received 15 and 5
respectively and in the low-dispersion treatments (L), they received 12 and 8 respectively.
Our experimental design ensures that, in the second stage, winners and losers in
the threshold treatments have the same monetary payoffs as winners and losers in the
competitive and random treatments. Therefore, conditional on being a winner or loser,
differences in behavior across treatments cannot be driven by differential payoffs. More-
over, this design should give rise to similar distributions of payments (mean and variance)
across treatments. While we were mainly interested in the differential effect of competitive
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versus threshold payments on changes in prosociality, we included the random payment
in order to isolate the potential effect of being confronted with another person from the
effect of receiving a differential payment.5 If prosociality were to decrease more in com-
petition than in random, we could attribute such an impact to being exposed to relative
payments. If the effect were of similar magnitude, then we could argue that it is not
competition that affects prosociality, but rather the inequality it generates.
As mentioned previously, while participants knew that the experiment had different
tasks, instructions were presented stage by stage. Information revelation occurred as
follows. Subjects were informed that either Stage 1 or Stage 3 and only one of the
prosociality games (either PGG or SVO) would be selected at random for payment. If
the SVO was selected, the role of dictator and one of the six decisions would also be
selected at random (given the strategy method was used). Feedback on these stages (in
particular Stage 1) was given only after subjects completed the post-questionnaire such
that changes in prosociality were unlikely to be due to endowment, learning, or reputation
effects. Participants did receive feedback immediately after the RE task and these earnings
were paid with certainty (unlike those for Stages 1 and 3). This was done to enhance the
salience of the main treatments, i.e. exposure to different payment schemes.
To further investigate the drivers of changes in prosocial behavior and complement the
findings from our treatments, we also had subjects complete a pre-survey. This included
questions on (1) basic socioeconomic characteristics, (2) work-related measures such as
job satisfaction, and (3) behavioral measures such as social preferences (including inequal-
ity aversion), risk and time preferences (a` la Charness and Viceisza, 2015), competitive
preferences (a` la Gneezy et al., 2009), Schwartz-values (a` la Schwartz, 1992), and self-
esteem. Inequality aversion and competitive preferences were elicited in an incentivized
way. As these measures were elicited before the experiment, they can be argued to be
exogenous to treatment. We thus use them to further explore the drivers of behavioral
change. We also obtained limited administrative data (e.g. job type and sector) from the
firm to validate/complement (some of) the work-related measures in the pre-survey.
2.4 Recruitment and sample
The firm provided a listing of its employees. This list included employee names and
identification numbers, sector numbers, and the type of job. A sample of employees was
randomly selected and assigned to experimental sessions. However, there was imperfect
compliance in terms of actual attendance. Employees had to be released by their sector
5Like treatments have also been compared to “murky” bonus schemes (e.g. Buser and Dreber, 2015).
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supervisors, some of whom were less cooperative. In addition, due to the nature of the
tasks, packing-house employees tended to be available during the morning. So, while rela-
tively substantial compared to the population of employees, our sample is not necessarily
representative of all sectors and job types across the firm.
In total, we conducted 51 sessions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon on
Mondays through Fridays, over the course of five weeks. The sessions were announced as
“workshops” and supervisors were informed of selected employees a week in advance in
order to release them at a given time. Table 2 shows the number of sessions, individuals,
winners, and losers across treatment conditions. Sessions lasted approximately three hours
and paid 26.31 Ghanaian cedi/GHS (USD 7), relative to a daily wage equivalent of GHS
18. A total of 619 individuals (589 of whom were men) showed up.
For purposes of internal validity, we run balancing tests across a wide range of pre-
characteristics as well as baseline levels of the outcome variables, PGG and SVO. Table
3 contains a select set of variables, in particular those that are significantly different at
the 5% level and below. As expected, subjects appear to be significantly different based
on some firm/work-related variables such as length of employment, bonus awareness, and
the number of other subjects they have “close” relationships with. In addition, subjects
appear to be different on age, education, and preferences for risk and competition. Finally,
subjects contribute differently to the PGG at baseline across treatments. In the following
section, we discuss how our estimation strategy deals with this unbalancedness.
Overall, the average participant is 31 years old, lives in a household with 5 persons
(including children), has been employed by the firm for 43 months, and has a close rela-
tionship with 1 other person in the session.
2.5 Empirical strategy
Given we collected measures of prosociality in Stages 1 and 3 (i.e., at baseline/pre-
treatment and follow-up/post-treatment) and there is evidence of some baseline imbal-
ance, we estimate our treatment effects according to the following specification:
∆Yi = β0 + βCCi + βRRi + βY0Yi0 + βZZi + i, (1)
where ∆Yi is the difference in prosociality between Stages 1 and 3 at the individual level
i; Ci and Ri are dummies for individual-level exposure to treatment, competition and
random respectively. So, threshold (Ti) is taken as the control. Yi0 is the initial level of
prosociality in Stage 1; Zi is a set of covariates comprising the unbalanced characteristics
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in Table 3; and i is an error term. We run these specifications for both PGG and SVO,
for the pooled sample as well as separately for the low- and high-dispersion subsamples.
To further tease apart mechanisms, we expand Equation 1 by adding interactions be-
tween the treatment dummies (Ci and Ri) and covariates of interest Xi. Among these
covariates are (1) whether or not the subject is a winner (i.e., earned 15 or 12 depend-
ing on whether s/he is in the high- or low-dispersion condition); (2) typical behavioral
measures such as risk and inequality aversion; (3) preferences for competition (see for
example Brandts et al., 2009; Gneezy et al., 2009); and (4) potentially relevant admin-
istrative/external variables such as (i) whether or not the subject engages in teamwork
(i.e., a more prosocial context) in her/his usual job and (ii) whether or not the subject is
aware of the bonus the firm currently has in place.
We thus run the following specification:
∆Yi = β0 + βCCi + βRRi + βXXi + βCXCiXi + βRXRiXi + βY0Yi0 + βZZi + i, (2)
where all is as defined previously.
2.6 Hypotheses
In lieu of a theoretical framework, we elaborate on the potential mechanisms for our
hypothesized effects in the context of existing literature. For example, consistent with
Buser and Dreber (2015), we expect the coefficient βC to be negative indicating a larger
decrease in prosociality in the competitive relative to the non-competitive (threshold)
payment scheme. We also expect the decrease in prosociality to be more pronounced in
the high-dispersion treatments (where winners earn 15 and losers earn 5) than in the low-
dispersion treatments (where they earn 12 and 8 respectively). This would be consistent
with Lazear (1989), although some of the mechanisms are likely to be different, given
sabotage is not possible in our context.
Erkal et al. (2011) and Schurr and Ritov (2016) find that winners of a competition
tend to behave in a less prosocial way than losers. Schurr and Ritov (2016) in particular
demonstrate that merely remembering the moment of winning a competition is sufficient
to increase cheating behavior. The implication for our context is that winning in a compe-
tition, thus alters prosocial behavior. So, winners might keep more money for themselves
(in PGG or SVO) in Stage 3 if they think that their “superior” (winner) status entitles
them to do so. Consistent with this finding, we would expect winners in competition to
decrease prosociality more in Stage 3 than winners in threshold, i.e. βC < 0.
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The coefficient βR further allows us to pin this down. In the random treatment, the
outcome is determined by sheer luck. So, a comparison of the effect of random and
competition enables us to assess whether income inequality alone explains the decrease in
prosociality. If that were the case, we would expect the effect of competition and random
to be similar in magnitude, i.e. βC ≈ βR. However, if competition generates a feeling
of rivalry and confrontation, we would expect the crowding-out effect of prosociality to
be larger in competition than in random, i.e. βC > βR in absolute terms. In summary,
a significant effect for βC but not for βR would be more solid evidence that changes in
prosociality are due to competition.
Evoked feelings of rivalry from competition (relative to the threshold treatment) could
also lead to a decrease in prosocial behavior. For example, Kilduff et al. (2016) find that
increased rivalry is related to “competitors” being more concerned with their status and
performance-oriented. Similar mechanisms could be at play here.
Finally, perceived unfairness of the competitive payment scheme could also affect
prosocial behavior (e.g Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Beliefs about unfairness could lead
to frustration and anger, which in turn could discourage worker effort and demotivate
them to behave prosocially. Subjects might perceive a competitive payment scheme as
unfair (relative to threshold), since there is an exclusive bonus that ultimately only one
worker in the dyad will benefit from. This perception might be particularly pronounced
for those who are (1) more inequality averse (e.g. Bartling et al., 2009); (2) less used to
incentive schemes as part of their day-to-day work environment (as proxied by not being
aware of the firm’s existing bonus system or not being used to working in teams); and (3)
more inclined to compete (as proxied by our measure of preferences for competition).
3 Results
3.1 Descriptives
To get a sense of potential unconditional treatment effects, we start with some graphs.
Figure 5 looks at the difference in PGG contributions and SVO angle between Stages 1
and 3 across threshold (T ), competition (C), and random (R) by low (L) and high (H)
dispersion. Two aspects are striking:
1. The bars for T and C typically point in opposite directions. Evidence is somewhat
mixed for C versus R.
2. Dispersion seems to matter. The bars for H point in the expected direction, specif-
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ically the contributions (and angle) in C decreased between Stages 1 and 3 while
they increased in T . However, the bars for L show the opposite.
Collectively, these findings suggest that competition led to a greater decrease in proso-
ciality across Stages 1 and 3 relative to the threshold treatment, but only when the dis-
persion between the winner’s and loser’s payoffs is high (i.e., when there is much at stake).
When the dispersion between the winner’s and loser’s payoffs is low, this effect is reversed.
Indeed, statistical tests confirm these findings for PGG (t-test, p-value < 0.1).
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the number of ballpoint pens assembled across
treatments. On average, subjects completed about 40 pens. Both, on average and over
the whole distribution, there are limited statistically significant impacts across treatments.
So, effort appears to be unaffected by the type of payment scheme, regardless of dispersion.
Perhaps this is not so surprising when comparing T and C as both treatments create
an incentive for higher performance. However, the finding that effort in R (the random
treatment) is similar to that in T and C is more striking, given the outcome is determined
by sheer luck. That said, this could be because subjects have exerted effort to attend the
session or feel observed by the experimenters (and indirectly, the firm) and thus have the
need to “do something” while sitting in the session.
As stated in Section 2.4, there are some baseline imbalances across treatments. So, the
claims made in this section should be taken with caution. Next, we present conditional
effects according to the specifications in Section 2.5.
3.2 Treatment effects
Table 4 presents the estimates of the treatment effects according to the specification in
Equation 1. Panel A presents the impacts on changes in PGG and Panel B presents the
impacts on changes in SVO. For the sake of brevity, the table does not explicitly report
the coefficients for the Z covariates; however, the table footnote lists the covariates that
are included when applicable. Results are available from the authors upon request.
In columns (1) and (2), we pool observations across high and low dispersion for the
three payment schemes: competition, random, and threshold. The constant term is pos-
itive and significant, indicating that in the threshold treatment (the omitted category)
there is an increase in prosociality from Stage 1 to Stage 3. The negative and significant
effect of the baseline level of prosociality (PGG and SVO) indicates that in Stage 3 the
dispersion in prosociality decreases. In other words, individuals with initially low levels
of prosociality cooperate more in the third stage than in the first stage, while individuals
with initially high levels of prosociality cooperate relatively less. Looking at the pooled
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data, competition seems to have no effect on prosociality. To investigate whether these
effects may be heterogeneous with respect to high and low dispersion, we run separate
regressions (columns 3-6).
Once we disaggregate by high and low dispersion, a different picture emerges. Under
high dispersion (columns 3 and 4) there seems to be an increase in prosociality in the
threshold treatment from the first to the third stage. Focusing on column (4), which
controls for the full spectrum of baseline imbalances, PGG contributions are 16.8% higher
post-treatment (although not statistically significant) and the SVO angle increases by
10.99 points post-treatment. However, PGG contributions increase by 5.6% less in the
competition than in the threshold between Stages 1 and 3. Similarly, the SVO angle
increases by 4.2 degrees (about 38%) less under competition than under threshold. Both
of these effects are significant at the 5% level. Prosociality increases less under random
than threshold for PGG (by 3.3%), but it increases more for SVO (by 0.5 degrees). These
comparisons are not significant. Across competition and random, the coefficients are
statistically similar for PGG, but different for SVO – the angle increases by 4.7 points
less in competition than in random (significant at the 5% level). These results suggest
that competition has a larger crowding-out effect on prosociality than random; at least as
far as SVO is concerned. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that competition
indeed can erode prosociality (a` la Lazear, 1989; Holmstro¨m, 2017).
Under low dispersion (columns 5 and 6), prosociality also increases in the threshold
treatment from the first to the third stage. However, contrary to the case of high dis-
persion, there are no differential changes in prosociality, be it for PGG or SVO, across
competition and threshold or random and threshold (once we control for socioeconomic
characteristics). The change in PGG or SVO across competition and random is also
insignificant. While we expected competition to have less of an impact on prosociality
in the presence of low rather than high dispersion, we did not expect this effect to be
statistically insignificant. In particular, these results suggest that competition need not
always lead to a decrease in prosociality. It depends on the context; notably, how well or
badly off the competition leaves winners and losers.
3.3 Mechanisms
To investigate potential mechanisms beyond those that are feasible using only our exper-
imental variations, we first run the specification in Equation 2. Table 5 summarizes the
effects for changes in prosociality across treatments for individuals of different character-
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istics X under high dispersion.6 The first, third and fifth columns present the effects for
changes in PGG and the second, fourth and sixth columns present the effects for changes
in SVO for comparisons between competition and threshold (columns 1 and 2), random
and threshold (columns 3 and 4), and these two former comparisons (columns 5 and 6).
The results for low dispersion are included in Table 6 in the Appendix.
We find the following under high dispersion:
1. Winners: Those who win the competition are less prosocial after having been ex-
posed to the competition than those who win in the threshold treatment. This effect
is only significant for changes in PGG contributions. This is consistent with Erkal
et al. (2011) who find that winners are more likely to behave in a selfish manner.
However, in contrast to Erkal et al. (2011), this does not seem to be due to selec-
tion of less prosocial types into the winner position as this specification controls for
various individual and social preferences as discussed previously. So, we think this
is more likely due to winner-subjects feeling more entitled and thus, believing they
deserved their payments more than had they been in the threshold treatment. High
earners in the random treatment, however, do not behave less cooperatively relative
to high earners in the threshold treatment. This suggests that competition indeed
has a distinct effect on winners, which is not only due to higher income. This also re-
lates to Gee et al. (2016) who find that when income is earned through performance,
individuals use income differences as a heuristic to infer relative deservingness.
2. Inequality aversion: Based on an easy distribution task by Fehr et al. (2008), we
classify individuals as inequality averse if they preferred an equal distribution over an
unequal distribution in all three questions (and not inequality averse otherwise). We
find that those who are inequality averse decrease prosociality (PGG) in competition
compared with threshold. The effect for SVO is also negative, but not statistically
significant. This is consistent with findings from Cherry et al. (2005) who find that
contribution levels are significantly lower when groups have heterogeneous (rather
than homogeneous) endowments. In the random treatment, we do not observe
differences in contributions to PGG or SVO for inequality averse individuals relative
to the threshold treatment. So, again, competition seems to trigger a different
behavior compared to the random treatment.
3. Risk seeking: We find no significant effect of risk preferences on changes in prosocial-
6The effects reported in this table are equivalent to (βC + βCX) + (β0 + βX) in Equation 2 (aka
contrasts, e.g. in Stata).
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ity between competition and threshold or across random and threshold, for either
PGG or SVO. This is different from for example Teyssier (2012) who finds that risk
aversion is significantly and negatively correlated with contributions of first movers;
although we recognize that our impacts are identified on changes in prosociality and
not contribution levels.
4. Preferences for competition: Competitive preferences are measured in the pre-survey
with a simple marble game in three stages a` la Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). We
find that preferences for competition do not explain differences in PGG or SVO
across treatments.
5. Working in teams: We find that participants who are used to working in teams,
reduce prosociality in competition relative to threshold. As before, the effect is
only significant for changes in PGG. This finding could imply that the erosion of
prosociality may be exacerbated when competition is induced between members of
same team rather than between teams. No such effects are observed in the random
treatment.7
6. Bonus awareness: Participants who are unaware of the firm’s existing bonus also
decrease prosociality in competition relative to threshold and in random compared
to threshold. The magnitude of this effect is higher for competition than for random.
This suggests that lack of prior exposure to related schemes can increase the negative
impacts of newly implemented relative-performance schemes.
Finally, under low dispersion, none of the covariates significantly predict differential
behavior across competition and threshold or random and threshold. That said, losers do
have a greater (positive) point estimate (albeit statistically insignificant) than winners,
possibly suggesting an effect a` la Schurr and Ritov (2016).
4 Conclusion
In this study, we conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with workers from an agribusiness
in Ghana to test whether competitive (relative to individual) payment schemes crowd out
prosociality in subsequent tasks. We thus partially revisit a question addressed by Buser
and Dreber (2015), but in a context where the findings have the potential to immediately
7Future work should explore whether inter-team competition has a differential effect on in- versus
out-group members.
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inform workplace and development policy. In particular, we seek to understand underlying
mechanisms by (1) experimentally varying the strength of the competition through the
dispersion between the winner’s and loser’s payoffs and (2) interacting treatment variation
with survey covariates as well as external, work-related variables.
When there is much at stake, i.e. when the dispersion between the winner’s and loser’s
payoffs is high, we confirm prior findings: Competition crowds out prosociality. This effect
seems to mainly be driven by those who (1) win the competition, (2) are inequality averse,
(3) usually work in teams and (4) are unaware of an already existing bonus scheme at the
firm. However, when there is less at stake, we find quite the opposite: Competition does
not affect prosociality. Closer analysis indicates that prosociality is also eroded under the
random payment scheme. However, this erosion (when measured using the social value
orientation game) is stronger under competition than under random.
Our results only partly replicate the findings by Buser and Dreber (2015), but are
in line with for example Schurr and Ritov (2016) who find that subject’s (dis)honesty is
impacted by exposure to competitive environments and Drago and Garvey (1998) who find
that strong promotion incentives crowd out helping behavior among coworkers. Overall,
our findings suggest that the impact of competitive schemes (such as bonuses and merit
pay based on relative performance) on cooperation is likely to be context-specific. So,
managers should keep the complexities and potential side effects of such incentive systems
in mind as they design and implement them in the workplace (as alluded to by for example
Lazear, 1989; Holmstro¨m, 2017).
Since we report results from a stylized experiment, we need to be cautious in deriving
implications for workplace policy. For example, typically coworkers interact frequently
and repetitively. They may also get feedback on their performance (say in form of bonus
pay) several times during the year. For example, Bandiera et al. (2013) have shown that,
in the short run, workers who once won a competition are more motivated to perform
on subsequent tasks. However, over a longer term, the bonus incentive may wear off and
workers may reduce their effort. Furthermore, the workers who rarely receive a bonus
may become dissatisfied with their job, which in turn can have negative consequences for
organizational efficiency (e.g. Miceli and Mulvey, 2000) or crowd out intrinsic motivation
(e.g. Bowles and Polan´ıa-Reyes, 2012). Finally, incentives may not work as intended
because they may interact with the degree of social ties among coworkers (e.g. Ashraf and
Bandiera, 2017).
In light of the above, our findings leave some avenues for future research. First, our
setting could be extended to include collaborative tasks where strategic complementarities
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are important. Second, the effect of different threshold levels on effort and subsequently
prosociality could be explored. Third, it would be interesting to look at environments
in which individual performance is not perfectly observable and could lead to perceived
discrimination (e.g. Grosch and Rau, 2017). Fourth, in lieu of a measure of cooperation
and prosociality, future work could look at the impact of different payment incentives
on subsequent effort provision/productivity tasks. Fifth, in light of the literature on
gender differences in competition (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2003, 2009) and uncertainty aversion
(e.g. Croson and Gneezy, 2009), future research could explore the differential impact of
competitive payments on cooperation across women and men (we did not have sufficient
variation in our sample to shed some light on this issue).
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Figure 2: PGG poster
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Figure 3: SVO poster
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Figure 4: Instruction phase
Figure 5: Changes in PGG contributions (left) and SVO angle (right) across treatments
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Figure 6: Distribution of effort across treatments
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Table 1: Experiment treatments
Competition (C) Threshold (T ) Random (R)
High (H) most pens earns 15 ≥ 40 pens earns 15 randomly earns 15
other earns 5 < 40 earns 5 other earns 5
Low (L) most pens earns 12 ≥ 40 pens earns 12 randomly earns 12
other earns 8 < 40 earns 8 other earns 8
Table 2: Number of observations
Treatment Sessions Individuals Winner Loser
CH 8 94 48 (0.51)∗ 46 (0.49)∗
CL 9 107 50 (0.47)∗ 57 (0.53)∗
TH 10 117 66 (0.56) 51 (0.44)
TL 10 105 69 (0.66) 36 (0.34)
RH 7 93 46 (0.49) 47 (0.51)
RL 7 103 54 (0.52) 49 (0.48)
Total 51 619 333 (0.54) 286 (0.46)
*If the number of subjects in a session was uneven, the “extra” subject was randomly assigned to an existing group.
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Table 3: Internal validity balancing tests
Variables Ni All CH CL TH TL RH RL p-value
Demographics
Age 618 31.26 31.94 30.80 32.92 32.13 29.88 29.62 0.03∗∗
Female 617 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02∗∗
Years of schooling 586 9.98 10.07 10.21 9.19 9.80 10.47 10.29 0.00∗∗∗
Ethnicitya 617 2.66 2.67 2.70 2.74 2.51 2.62 2.65 0.71
Marital Statusb 610 1.52 1.56 1.54 1.46 1.52 1.48 1.53 0.85
HH size 603 5.20 5.91 4.82 5.56 4.92 4.74 5.23 0.06
Povertyc 601 1.34 1.40 1.49 1.49 1.32 1.26 1.31 0.40
Behavioral
Trustd 619 0.89 0.95 0.87 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.22
Fairnesse 618 0.39 0.34 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.46 0.67
Risk seekingf 606 3.88 3.41 3.70 3.37 3.86 4.59 4.43 0.00∗∗
Inequality averseg 619 2.51 2.70 2.35 2.75 2.44 2.37 2.42 0.18
Timeh 605 202.20 191.68 186.75 157.57 192.07 184.13 300.70 0.26
Competitioni 619 0.62 0.46 0.70 0.52 0.62 0.71 0.73 0.00∗∗
Schwartz valuesj
Benevolence 617 4.53 4.39 4.61 4.50 4.51 4.66 4.48 0.07
Conformity 618 4.57 4.54 4.64 4.60 4.55 4.53 4.51 0.67
Collectivism 619 0.73 0.62 0.73 0.71 0.78 0.75 0.76 0.15
Firm-related
Months employed 611 42.60 41.18 45.74 49.41 45.17 42.75 30.20 0.00∗∗∗
Monthly wage 610 374.19 377.49 390.38 373.99 369.43 365.85 366.87 0.18
Aware of bonus 619 0.69 0.46 0.72 0.62 0.71 0.77 0.82 0.00∗∗∗
Works in team 614 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.51 0.38 0.46 0.36 0.06
Job satisfactionk 615 4.50 4.33 4.60 4.51 4.38 4.64 4.56 0.00∗∗∗
Job type 606 4.79 4.61 4.92 4.56 4.89 5.39 4.44 0.16
Sector 602 4.64 4.89 4.49 4.26 4.97 4.96 4.41 0.08
Close relationsl 615 1.18 1.16 1.14 1.53 1.24 0.58 1.30 0.00∗∗∗
Outcomes
PGG (stage 1) 619 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.45 0.52 0.04∗∗
SVO (stage 1) 619 21.82 20.95 22.78 22.57 22.76 18.67 22.62 0.09
PGG (stage 3) 619 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.13
SVO (stage 3) 619 22.23 19.80 23.01 23.04 22.16 20.84 24.02 0.16
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05. The last column is obtained by running a one-way ANOVA
test. These values are also robust to running a seemingly unrelated regression model for
continuous variables and a χ2-test for categorical variables. The tests for baseline equivalence
of outcomes (PGG and SVO) are additionally robust to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Variable definitions (see questionnaires for additional detail): a 1=Akan, 2=Ewe, 3=Ga/
Dangbe, 4=Krobo, 5=Hausa; b 1=married, 2=single, 3=separated, 4=divorced, 5=widowed;
c number of adults per bedroom in the home; d 0=most people can be trusted, 1=need to
be very careful trusting; e 0=most people take advantage, 1=most people try to be fair; f
number of seeds out of 10 chosen that are risky; g based on payoff equalization or not (aka
Fehr allocation activity); h average GHS needed in one month to sacrifice 100 GHS tomorrow;
i based on choice to be paid relative to someone else (compete) in a marble activity; j based
on Schwartz (1992); k 1=terrible, 2=unhappy, 3=mixed, 4=mostly satisfied, 5=pleased; l
number of people known during experiment session.
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Table 4: Treatment effects on change in PGG and SVO (pooled, high, low dispersion)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pooled Pooled High High Low Low
Panel A: ∆ PGG contributions
Competition (C) -0.0177 -0.0113 -0.0768** -0.0561** 0.0409 0.0580
(0.0230) (0.0220) (0.0276) (0.0216) (0.0290) (0.0348)
Random (R) -0.0180 0.00156 -0.0534** -0.0325 0.0220 0.0591
(0.0208) (0.0227) (0.0208) (0.0193) (0.0306) (0.0388)
Baseline PGG (Yi0) -0.447*** -0.458*** -0.422*** -0.427*** -0.462*** -0.476***
(0.0454) (0.0460) (0.0665) (0.0705) (0.0633) (0.0592)
Constant 0.213*** 0.180** 0.234*** 0.168 0.184*** -0.144
(0.0266) (0.0757) (0.0394) (0.108) (0.0326) (0.105)
R-squared 0.218 0.242 0.226 0.308 0.237 0.320
C vs. R 0.0002 -0.0129 -0.0234 -0.0236 0.0189 -0.0010
(0.0219) (0.0196) (0.0265) (0.0248) (0.0310) (0.0233)
Panel B: ∆ SVO angle
Competition -1.060 -1.040 -3.586** -4.199** 1.292 1.037
(1.103) (1.108) (1.409) (1.854) (1.543) (2.019)
Random 1.489 0.921 -0.151 0.490 3.114* 2.821
(1.004) (1.233) (1.189) (1.201) (1.604) (2.227)
Baseline SVO (Yi0) -0.661*** -0.652*** -0.655*** -0.657*** -0.680*** -0.635***
(0.0498) (0.0507) (0.0687) (0.0741) (0.0740) (0.0736)
Constant 14.86*** 12.87** 15.44*** 10.99** 14.45*** 22.82**
(1.368) (5.123) (1.787) (5.048) (2.155) (8.972)
R-squared 0.325 0.347 0.302 0.341 0.358 0.406
C vs. R -2.550** -1.961 -3.435** -4.689** -1.822 -0.001
(1.165) (1.212) (1.510) (1.915) (1.631) (0.023)
Observations 539 539 262 262 277 277
Covariatesa NO YES NO YES NO YES
+ Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a Covariates: age, female, education, risk, inequality averse, poverty, competition, months
employed, bonus awareness, job satisfaction, close relations, order of PGG and SVO, day
and time of the session.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous effects on change in PGG and SVO (high dispersion)a
(C vs. T) (R vs. T) (C vs. T) vs. (R vs. T)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ PGG ∆ SVO ∆ PGG ∆ SVO ∆ PGG ∆ SVO
Income effect
loser -0.0239 -4.3625 -0.0173 -6.8019 -0.0066 2.4394***
(0.0562) (3.3742) (0.0579) (3.6976) (0.006) (0.373)
winner -0.1309*** -4.0296 -0.0419 -1.5370 -0.0890*** -2.4926***
(0.0403) (2.8920) (0.0389) (1.6196) (0.004) (0.246)
Behavioral variables
not inequality averse -0.0335 -3.7620 -0.0065 -4.9172 -0.0270*** 1.1552***
(0.0322) (3.2476) (0.0337) (3.6099) (0.003) (0.362)
inequality averse -0.1214* -4.6301 -0.0527 -3.4217 -0.0687*** -1.2084***
(0.0682) (3.4913) (0.0603) (2.7935) (0.007) (0.332)
risk seeking 0.0028 0.0439 -0.0075 1.1677 0.0103*** -1.1238***
(0.0087) (0.5227) (0.0087) (0.5078) (0.001) (0.054)
dislikes competition -0.0871 -3.3085 -0.0411 -3.4614 -0.0460*** 0.1529
(0.0543) (3.3379) (0.0411) (2.4085) (0.005) (0.306)
likes competition -0.0676 -5.0836 -0.0182 -4.8775 -0.0494*** -0.2061
(0.0441) (3.3031) (0.0438) (3.4188) (0.005) (0.354)
Work-related variables
does not work in teams -0.0411 -4.5677 -0.0467 -1.1657 0.0056 -3.4020***
(0.0373) (3.1905) (0.0326) (2.3815) (0.004) (0.296)
works in teams -0.1138* -3.8243 -0.0125 -7.1732 -0.1013*** 3.3489***
(0.0617) (3.2144) (0.0602) (3.4140) (0.006) (0.349)
is not aware of bonus -0.1081** -6.4739** -0.0930** -3.8571 -0.0151*** -2.6168***
(0.0489) (3.0383) (0.0396) (1.9608) (0.005) (0.268)
is aware of bonus -0.0466 -0.9182 0.0338 -4.4818 -0.0804*** 3.5636***
(0.0455) (3.3706) (0.0544) (3.5504) (0.005) (0.365)
R-squared 0.3476 0.3710 0.3476 0.3710
Observations 262 262 262 262
Covariatesb YES YES YES YES
+ Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a This table presents contrasts across C and T in columns (1) and (2), i.e., (βC + βCX) +
(β0 + βX) as discussed in Section 3.3. Contrasts across R and T are shown in columns (3)
and (4). In columns (5) and (6), we apply a t-test to examine significant differences between
results from column (1) vs. column (3) and column (2) vs. column (4) respectively.
b Covariates: baseline PGG or SVO, age, female, education, risk, preference for competition,
months employed, bonus awareness, job satisfaction, close relations, order of PGG and SVO,
day and time of the session.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous effects on change in PGG and SVO (low dispersion)a
(C vs. T) (R vs. T) (C vs. T) vs. (R vs. T)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ PGG ∆ SVO ∆ PGG ∆ SVO ∆ PGG ∆ SVO
Income effect
loser 0.0646 0.5790 -0.0590 2.0844 0.1236*** -1.5054***
(0.0859) (4.1416) (0.0814) (6.1982) (0.009) (0.551)
winner -0.0220 0.1261 -0.0867 1.2186 0.0647*** -1.0925**
(0.0774) (2.9798) (0.0745) (4.9874) (0.008) (0.430)
Behavioral variables
not inequality averse 0.0022 -0.8651 -0.0566 -0.1196 0.0588*** -0.7455*
(0.0715) (3.3825) (0.0729) (4.7944) (0.008) (0.434)
inequality averse 0.0404 1.5702 -0.0892 3.4226 0.1296*** -1.8524**
(0.0979) (4.2841) (0.0904) (6.4010) (0.010) (0.570)
risk seeking 0.0143 0.4117 0.0230* 0.5119 -0.0087*** -0.1002**
(0.0147) (0.3598) (0.0118) (0.5250) (0.001) (0.047)
dislikes competition 0.0238 -0.8102 -0.0493 -0.3645 0.0731*** -0.4457
(0.0858) (3.6660) (0.0927) (6.2201) (0.009) (0.534)
likes competition 0.0188 1.5153 -0.0965 3.6675 0.1153*** -2.1522***
(0.0808) (3.9717) (0.0745) (5.0919) (0.008) (0.477)
Work-related variables
does not work in teams -0.0005 -0.2476 -0.0696 1.8968 0.0691*** -2.1444***
(0.0713) (4.0153) (0.0782) (6.1735) (0.008) (0.545)
works in teams 0.0431 0.9527 -0.0762 1.4061 0.1193*** -0.4534
(0.0929) (3.8317) (0.0870) (5.3102) (0.009) (0.484)
is not aware of bonus 0.0403 1.8906 -0.1398 3.9170 0.1801*** -2.0264**
(0.0895) (5.1206) (0.0918) (7.5238) (0.009) (0.673)
is aware of bonus 0.0023 -1.1855 -0.0060 -0.6140 0.0083 -0.5715
(0.0823) (3.2735) (0.0823) (3.7850) (0.009) (0.370)
R-squared 0.3633 0.4152 0.3633 0.4152
Observations 277 277 277 277
Covariatesb YES YES YES YES
+ Robust standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
a This table presents contrasts across C and T , i.e., (βC + βCX) + (β0 + βX) as discussed in
Section 3.3. Contrasts across R and T are shown in columns (3) and (4). In columns (5)
and (6), we apply a t-test to examine significant differences between results from column (1)
vs. column (3) and column (2) vs. column (4) respectively.
b Covariates: baseline PGG or SVO, age, female, education, risk, preference for competition,
months employed, bonus awareness, job satisfaction, close relations, order of PGG and SVO,
day and time of the session.
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